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INTRODUCI10N

INCE the seminal case of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,'

Swhich extended the reach of the Fifth Amendment's Takings

Clause to "regulatory takings,"2 scholars and courts alike have
struggled to demarcate a principled boundary between com
pensable and uncompensable regulatory takings.3 This effort has
been so unsuccessful as to prompt a leading commentator to con
clude that "[t]hroughout constitutional jurisprudence, only the
right of privacy can compete seriously with takings law for the
doctrine-in-most-desperate-need-of-a-principle prize. "4 Takings
jurisprudence is replete with inconsistent distinctions that provide
scant guidance for courts and policymakers.5 Indeed, in Penn CenJ 260 u.s. 393 (1922).
2ld. at41S.
3 See discussion infra Part I.
4 Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 Yale W. 1077, 1081 {1993). Rubenfeld is not alone.
The list of critics of the Court's takings jurisprudence is long and impressive. See, e.g.,
Bruce A. Ackerman, Private Property and the Constitution 3 (1977) (calling takings
jurisprudence "a set of confused judicial responses"); Raymond R. Coletta, Reciproc
ity of Advantage and Regulatory Takings: Toward a New Theory of Takings
Jurisprudence, 40 Am. U. L Rev. 297, 299-300 {1990) {calling takings jurisprudence a
"chameleon of ad hoc decisions that has bred considerable confusion"); Gideon Kan
ner, Hunting the Snark, Not the Quark: Has the U.S. Supreme Court Been
Competent in Its Effort to Formulate Coherent Regulatory Takings Law?, 30 Urb.
Law. 307, 308 {1998) ("The incoherence of the U.S. Supreme Court's output in this
field has by now been demonstrated time and again by practitioners and academic
commentators ad nauseam, and I refuse to add to the ongoing gratuitous slaughter of
trees for the paper consumed in this frustrating and increasingly pointless enter
prise."); Andrea L. Peterson, The Takings Clause: In Search of Underlying Principles
Part I-A Critique of Current Takings Oause Doctrine, 77 Cal. L. Rev. 1299, 1304
(1989) ("[I]t is difficult to imagine a body of case law in greater doctrinal and concep
tual disarray."); Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still
a Muddle, 57 S. Cal. L. Rev. 56, 61-62 (1984) ("By far the most intractable
constitutional property issue is whether certain governmental actions 'take'
property[;] . .. commentators propose test after test to define 'takings,' while courts
continue to reach ad hoc determinations rather than principled resolutions.").
5 Compare, e.g., Mille r v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 279-80 (1928) (finding no taking
where a state regulation required owners to cut down red cedar trees infected with a
virus that could kill apple trees, and noting that ''where the public interest is involved
preferment of that interest over the property interest of the individual, to the extent
even of its destruction, is one of the distinguishing characteristics of every exercise of
the police power which affects property"), with Dep't of Agric. & Consumer Servs. v.
Mid-Fla. Growers, 521 So. 2d 101 (Fla. 1988) (holding that full and just compensation
was required when the state, pursuant to its police power, destroyed healthy trees),
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 870 (1988); compare Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (holding that elimina-
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New York City,6 the Supreme Court itself

acknowledged its failure "to develop any 'set formula' for deter
mining when 'justice and fairness' require that economic injuries
caused by public action be compensated by the government," and
dubbed takings cases "essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries. "7
The regulatory takings conundrum has so bewitched academics
that it has blinded them to the existence of a companion problem
lying at the core of ordinary takings jurisprudence: the problem of
externalities produced by takings, or, as we shall call them in this
Essay, derivative takings. The problem of derivative takings is best
illustrated by the case of United States v. Causby.8 In Causby, the
plaintiffs-respondents claimed that the establishment of an air
route above their houses worked a taking on their property. Writ
ing for the Court, Justice William 0. Douglas ruled that the
establishment of the air routes created an easement on the prop
erty owners' air rights. However, he ruled that only those property
owners whose houses lay directly below the air routes had a right to
compensation under the Fifth Amendment. Justice Douglas denied
compensation to the other property owners, who incurred essen
tially the same harm as a result of the same government action, on
the grounds that their property had not suffered a "physical inva
sion."9
The result in Causby is neither fair nor efficient_l0 The outcome
is unfair because, from the point of view of the equally harmed
property owners, the location of the lots relative to the flight routes
is irrelevant and arbitrary. Harm to the property directly overtion of mining rights is a taking), with Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBene
dictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987) (holding that elimination of mining rights is not a taking).
6

438 u.s. 104 (1978).

7

Id. at 124 (citing Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S.

8

328 u.s. 256 (1946).

590,594 (1962)).

9ld. at260.
10 Th
e troubling result in Causby has been noted by others. Richard Epstein noted
that Causby erred in treating the "entrance into protected airspace, [and] not the dis
turbance it generated, [as] the gist of the government wrong." Richard A. Epstein,
Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain 50 (1985). Frank
Michelman more charitably attributed the "jarring" result in Causby to the need for
administrable doctrine. Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Com
ments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 Harv. L. Rev.
1165, 1170 (1967). William Fischel has simply labeled the rule of Causby "perplexing
if not silly." William A. Fischel, Regulatory Takings: Law, Economics and Politics 96

(1995).
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flown-the physical taking-is fully compensated, while the same
harm to the neighboring lot which lies one inch from the line of the
11
air route-the derivative taking-remains fully uncompensated.
The outcome is inefficient because it permits the government to
extemaliie on private property owners a substantial part of the
cost of a decision or policy that is acknowledged to be a taking,
leading to inaccurate assessments of the cost effectiveness and de
sirability of government policies.
The derivative takings problem raised by Causby is present in
almost every case of a physical taking. For example, every time the
government condemns property to pave a road, it only compen
sates the owners on whose property the road passes. Owners of
abutting lots receive no compensation for the diminution in their
properties' value, even though the diminution results directly from
the government's exercise of the power of eminent domain. Even
the Supreme Court-while maintaining the rule of Causby-has
noted the anomaly created by the "gross disparity between the
landowner whose premises are taken for a highway (who recovers
in full} and the landowner whose property is reduced to 5% of its
2
former value by the highway (who recovers nothing)."1
We argue, contrary to accepted lore, that takings come in three
forms, not two: physical takings, regulatory takings, and derivative
takings. The three are analytically distinct. A physical taking occurs
when the state seizes a property interest in order to put it to public
use. In a regulatory taking, the state does not seize the property in
terest, but regulates its use in a manner that unduly diminishes
property values.13 A derivative taking is present whenever a taking
diminishes the value of surrounding property. Derivative takings
are a hybrid of their more familiar close cousins. They resemble
regulatory takings in that they reduce the value of property with
out physically appropriating it. Yet, they are distinct from
regulatory takings in that they may arise as the result of a physical
11
Saul Levmore bas pointed out that lower courts appear to have added a require
ment of low altitude as well as direct overflight before compensation will be ordered.
See cases cited in Saul Levmore,Takings,Torts, and Special Interests, 77 Va. L. Rev.
1333,1352-53, 1353 n.29 (1991).
u Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 n.8 {1992). The legal recourse
available to these owners is in tort, namely in a nuisance action. We discuss the inade
quacy of this option in Section ll.B.1, infra.
13 See Mahon,260 U.S. at 413 {1922).

2001]

Takings Reassessed

281

taking. And, unlike its cousins, the derivative taking never appears
alone; it must always be preceded by a physical or regulatory tak14
.
�g.
Our goal in this Essay is twofold. Descriptively, we bring to light
the problem of derivative takings. We show that derivative takings
pervade virtually every government action affecting property. Pre
scriptively, we craft a workable mechanism for rectifying the
problem of derivative takings. Compensating property owners for
harms from derivative takings implicates two principal challenges:
inadministrability and inadequate information. The first concern
stems from the fear that the judicial system will collapse if a large
number of new takings cases are admitted for consideration. The
second concern derives from the fact that with derivative takings,
as with any other externality, the government lacks sufficient in
formation as to the exact identity of the harmed group and the
magnitude of the harm. Self-assessment is capable of allaying both
concerns. As we will show, a properly designed self-assessment
mechanism can dramatically reduce the cost of compensating
property owners. Furthermore, it can induce property owners to
report truthfully the harms occasioned. on them by government ac
tion. Moreover, we show that our proposed mechanism is, in
principle, applicable to the two other types of takings-physical
takings and regulatory takings-and, thus, it may serve as a unify
ing principle in an area in desperate need of one.
The best way to illustrate how self-assessment works is through a
stylized example. Imagine that the state decides to pave a road. To
this end, it takes four lots and compensates the owners of the lots
taken. Assume that this action reduces the value of each of the four
neighboring lots that now abut the road by $50,000. Under our
proposed system, the four neighbors will report to the state both
their belief that they suffered a derivative taking and the magni
tude of the loss (in this case $50,000 each), and in principle, they
will be entitled to this amount.
To counter the proclivity of the assessors to exaggerate in their
own favor by overstating the magnitude of their losses, the state
•

14 As we discuss elsewhere, a derivative taking may also result from a physical or
regulatory giving. See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Givings (March 1,

2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Virginia Law Review Association).
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must employ probabilistic audits and penalties of sufficient magni
tude to deter false reporting. This can be achieved due to the
unique informational basis the state has in this context. To slightly
modify the previous example, assume now that each of the four
homeowners exaggerates her damage by $10,000 (reporting
$60,000 each, instead of $50,000). To deter exaggerations, the state
audits and sues only one of the four homeowners. To make up for
the fact that it has identified only one of the four exaggerating
owners, the state can impose a false reporting penalty of three
times the magnitude of the exaggeration.15 Concretely, in this case,
the state will assess a penalty of $30,000 on the one audited home
owner. The state will therefore grant her only $20,000 in
compensation. Implemented correctly, this mechanism makes
truthful reporting the profit-maximizing strategy for each of the
homeowners, and ensures that the government does not overpay
for its takings.
Although the mechanism may sound unusual, it is not unprece
dented; it resembles a procedure in use in the income tax arena.16
Yet, there are some informational differences that make our
mechanism more efficient. In the tax context, the state often lacks
a benchmark against which to measure the truthfulness of self
assessments. Here, by contrast, the derivative takings reports may
be measured against two important baselines: the compensation
paid to the homeowners whose property was physically taken and
the reports of other neighbors claiming derivative takings. Fur
thermore, because the state will know the enforcement rate and
the exaggeration rate, it can calibrate the penalties to offset any in
centive to overreport. .
The outcomes generated by our mechanism increase both effi
ciency and fairness. Forcing the state to bear the full cost of its
actions helps ensure that the state uses its eminent domain power

15 We discuss further the ideal magnitude of the penalty and the assumptions under
lying this example in Part III.A, infra.
16 �aul Levmore has suggested more widespread use of self-assessment mechanisms.
See Saul Levmore, Self-Assessed Valuation Systems for Tort and Other Law, 68 Va.
L. Rev. 771 (1982); discussion infra Part III; see also Peter F. Colwell, Privatization of
Assessment, Zoning and Eminent Domain, ORER Letter (Off. Real Est. Res., U. 111.
Urbana-Champaign), Spring 1990, at 1-7 (endorsing self-assessment for property
taxes, takings and other property-related value assessments).
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only when doing so enhances social utility.17 The full compensation
afforded to owners guarantees efficient investment in property. In
sofar as fairness is concerned, our system guarantees just
compensation to all homeowners who suffer a harm as a result of
government action, eliminating the risk that the public at large will
benefit at the expense of few. Furthermore, the mechanism we
propose reduces or eliminates two distortions characteristic of tak
ings. First, it reduces the disparate impact of eminent domain on
the poor, thus creating a desirable distributive effect. Roads and
undesirable public facilities are usually built in poor areas because
the value of property in such areas is lower. As a result, derivative
takings are much more prevalent in poor neighborhoods.18 Our sys·
tem remedies this problem by ensuring that the poor receive
compensation for the burdens they are forced to bear. Second, our
proposal offers the advantage of a dramatic reduction in admin
istrative costs in compensating for takings. The fear of inadminis
trability has had an important role in shaping takings doctrine and
is responsible for many of the doctrine's distortions. Alleviating
this concern can open the way to a more coherent, efficient, and
just takings policy.
We wish to emphasize at the outset that throughout this Essay
we remain agnostic as to the definition of a compensable taking.
Instead, we assume that once an action is already deemed a taking,
the government should account for the full cost of its action to the
extent that it is administratively feasible. In accordance with this
assumption, we seek to expose the full range of costs occasioned by
actions that are already recognized as takings and develop a supe
rior administrative mechanism for compensation.
In Part I, we briefly review the current state of takings jurispru
dence. In Part II, we present our modified typology of takings
instances. In this Part, we present the problem of derivative takings
and we evaluate its effects on fairness and efficiency. In Part m,
17 We discuss in greater detail below the question of whether the government should
be treated as a rational wealth·maximizing economic actor. See infra note 53 and ac

companying text.
"'In a study of exercises of eminent domain in Chicago, Patricia Munch demon·
strated that that the indigent (those with lower value property) were consistently
undercompensated relative to the affluent (those with higher value property) due to
the high cost of litigating appeals of government appraisals. See Patricia Munch, An
Economic Analysis of Eminent Domain, 84 J. Pol. Econ.473, 487-88 (1976).
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we craft our solution to the problem of derivative takings-self
assessment-and devise a mechanism that ensures truthful report
ing. We conclude in Part IV by developing the possibility of using
our self-assessment scheme in other areas of takings jurisprudence,
especially in the context of regulatory takings.
I. THE TAKINGS TRIANGLE
As a formal matter, the takings conundrum involves nothing
more than identifying at which apex of the eminent domain-tax
police power triangle a government action lies. The Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution demands that the government
compensate property owners when it "takes" the property through
its power of eminent domain.111 However, when the government
''takes', through taxes, or reduces value by exercise of its police
powers, it need not compensate.20 Yet, the label chosen by the gov
ernment is not dispositive. When regulation-normally, a
legitimate exercise of the police power-reduces property values
too much, it ceases to be an exercise of the police power and be
comes an exercise of the power of eminent domain-thus a
compensable taking.21 For the formalist, compensable takings in all
1' The Fifth Amendment only applies to the national government, but the Four
teenth Amendment incorporates the Bill of Rights' protections (including the Takings
Clause) against actions of state governments. See Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co.
v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226,241 (1897) (incorporating the right to just compensation into
the Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment).
20see Penn Cent Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). The gov4
ernment may also reduce value by committing a tort. However, it cannot be said that
there is a government "power'' to commit torts. See discussion infra Section II.B.l.
For an argument that the original understanding of the Takings Clause mandates that
only physical appropriations be viewed as requiring compensation, see WilHam M.
Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political Process,
95 Colum. L. Rev. 782 (1995).
:ou See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). Justice Holmes identified
those regulations that have become exercises of the power of eminent domain as
regulations that have gone "too far." Holmes assumed, in accordance with constitu
tional doctrine of his time, that such "excessive" regulations of property rights would
set them afoul of the court's limitations on the exercise of the police power, founded
in economic substantive due process or the Contracts Clause, and that the regulations
could therefore be justified only with respect to the power of eminent domain. See
Glen E. Summers, Private Property Without Lochner. Toward a Takings Jurispru
dence Uncorrupted by Substantive Due Process, 142 U. Pa. L. Rev. 837, 846-54
(1993}; cf. Robert Brauneis, "The Foundation of Our 'Regulatory Takings' Jurispru
d ence": The Myth and Meaning of Justice Holmes's Opinion in Pennsylvania Coal
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cases are easily identified by stripping away the label and uncover
ing the nature of the actual state power being exercised.
But the formalist approach is deeply unsatisfying. To begin with,
the categories are so vague as to settle nothing. How does one tell
the difference between exercises of the police power, the taxing
power, and the power of eminent domain? After all, once the court
is willing to look beyond the label attached by the state, the court
must rely on some substantive differences between the different
powers that make them intrinsically and identifiably different. The
mere label solves nothing. And more importantly, why ought the
right to compensation turn on the nature of the exercised power?
Why is an uncompensated diminution of value constitutionally of
fensive when it results from an exercise of the power of eminent
domain, but not when it results from the taxing or police powers?
The difficulties in line drawing have been compounded in recent
decades by the emergence of new understandings of property.
First, as Cass Sunstein has noted in another context, the New Deal
undid the notion of groperty rights as fixed objects in the constitu
tional constellation. In the post-New Deal universe, property
became a legal construct to be reengineered at will by the legisla
ture. This made takings a far more nebulous subject; what might
have previously seemed like a seizure of property could be justified
in the post-New Deal era as a mere redefinition of property rights.
Thus, where the nineteenth-century Supreme Court could view
"harm prevention" as a definitively regulatory concept,23 the late
twentieth-century Court saw it as simply another justification for
redefining property rights that could, in the appropriate circum
stances, be viewed as a seizure.2�
Second, as Charles Reich established in his celebrated article
The New Property,25 the vastly expanded role of government al
tered traditional concepts of the source and nature of wealth and
property. Administrative regulation became the source of vast
wealth, or, in some cases, the solvent that wiped away an entire

Co. v. Mahon, 106 Yale W.

613 (1996) (arguing that Mahon is best understood as an
expression of Holmes's multifaceted theory of the constitutional protection of prop
erty).
21See Cass Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 873 (1987).
23 See, e.g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 664--69 {1887).
2.1 See Lucas v. S.C Coastal Council, SOS U.S. 1003, 1022-26 {1992).
25 Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 Yale L.J. 733 {1964).
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class of property. With the police power becoming the dominant
creator of wealth, the importance of traditional confiscation pro
ceedings as means of extinguishing property rights shrank relative
to the power of regulation.
Third, and most importantly, the once-dominant notion of prop
erty as a discrete thing has been replaced by an understanding that
sees property as a bundle of almost infinitely divisible rights.26 As
the concept of property has subdivided, the different government
actions affecting property rights have come to be seen as differing
only in degree and never in kind. With property now viewed as a
bundle of sticks of rights, it is unclear how many sticks have to be
removed before a taking occurs.27
For the past quarter century, the judiciary has struggled unsuc
cessfully with this new reality, failing to craft a coherent takings
doctrine. In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City,'/!
the Court explicitly raised its hands and established an ad hoc in
quiry comprising three factors for identifying takings in actions that
purport to be exercises of the police power: the owner's reasonable
investment-backed expectations, the nature of the government ac
tion, and the degree of diminution in property value.29 At the same
time, the Court refused to let go of traditional identification
schemes characteristic of the pre-New Deal era. Notwithstanding
the Penn Central test, permanent physical invasions alone are tak:
ings,30 prevention of noxious uses may block the finding of a

26See Michael A. Heller,The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 Yale L.J.1163,
1189-94 {1999) ("Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon marks the beginning of the Court's
dramatic shift away from thing-ownership
toward the bundle metaphor
")
w See generally Ackerman, supra note 4, at 116-18 (discussing the difference be·
tween the layman's view of property and the more complex reality of property as
various collections of "property-bundles"). Much of the debate between Justices
Holmes and Brandeis in Mahon turned on whether the state act bad removed an en
tire estate. Compare Mahon, 260 U.S. at 414 (Justice Holmes noting that the state act
"purports to abolish what is recognized in Pennsylvania as an estate in land"), with id.
at 419 (Brandeis. J., dissenting) {"The rights of an owner as against the public are not
mcreased by dividing the interests in his property into surface and subsoil!'). See also
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S.104, 130 {1978) C"Taking• juris·
prudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments and attempt to
determine whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely abrogated.").
28 438 U.S. at 130.
•

.

.

• • . •

,

:zg See id. at 124.
30 See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419,426 {1982).
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taking,:u and a complete wipeout of property value not ascribable
to nuisance prevention is a per se taking.32 Arching over the entire
scheme, the Court's new substantive economic due process ap
proach requires a rational "nexus"" and/or "rough proportionality"34
between the government action and its goal.35
This confounding welter of cases represents only the Court's at
tempt to patrol the line between eminent domain and police
powers. The Court has never seriously addressed the relationship
of the taxing power to either of these two powers, leaving most of
the area of the takings triangle in the shadow of uncertainty.
Coming to the aid of the courts, theoreticians have proposed a
plethora of alternative litmus tests for the Takings Clause.36 The
most extreme view is associated with Richard Epstein, who would
see practically any government action that diminished property
values-whether stemming from tax, eminent domain, or police
powers-as a taking for which compensation is constitutionally
mandated.37 At the other end, Louis Kaplow, similarly failing to
identify any grounds for distinguishing compensable takings from
other government actions diminishing property values, has ex
pressed some doubt about the attractiveness of government
compensation altogether.38 Kaplo�9 and Lawrence Blume and

See Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S.394 (1915).
See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council,505 U.S. 1003, 1028-29 (1992).
» Nollan v.Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825,837 (1987).The Court required that
the government action "'substantially advance' ... [a] 'legitimate state interest[]!" Id.
at 834 (quoting Agins v.Tibuton, 447 U.S. 255.260 (1980)).
34 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374,391 (1994).
S5 While the Court has not identified the rationality portion of its takings jurispru
dence as "substantive due process," it is substantive due process that provides the
pedigree and the likely doctrinal justification for requiring regulations to be under
taken by means of the power of eminent domain rather than a police power. See City
of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, 526 U.S. 687, 753 (1999) ( Souter,J.,
concuning in part and dissenting in part); supra note 21.
36 There have also been more modest attempts to clean up the doctrine without nec
essarily resorting to grand theory. See, e.g.,Andrea L Peterson, The Takings Clause:
In Search of Underlying Principles Part U-Takings As Intentional Deprivations of
Property Without Moral Justification, 78 Cal.L. Rev.53 (1990).
'S1 See Epstein, supra note 10, at 35-36. Epstein also sees torts as giving rise to con
stitutionally required compensation.
38 See Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 Harv. L. Rev.
509,531 (1986).
39 See id.at 538-41.
Jt
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Daniel Rubinfeld40 have suggested that privately supplied insur
ance for government-induced diminution of property values might
be pJ;eferable to a scheme of government-provided compensation;
Blume and Rubinfeld concluded accordingly that compensation
should mimic insurance and be available only where the owners
are highly risk-averse and the losses large.41
Other commentators have clustered around intermediate posi
tions, most famously explained by Frank Michelman, who
proposed that when a utilitarian calculus demonstrates the net
positive·bene:fi.t of the government action, one might appropriately
let the losses lay where they fall and refuse to pay compensation.42
Michelman himself maintained some skepticism about the utilitar
ian approach, and he insisted that, at the very least, one of the costs
to be taken into account is the demoralization that may result from
the feeling of having been victimized by a government taking.43
Any number of additional theorists, most less squeamish about
utilitarianism, have found themselves similarly attracted to inter
mediate positions.44
Yet a third group of theories focus on the government's pre
taking motivation or post-taking use of the property. Joseph Sax
has proposed requiring compensation whenever the government
acts like an enterprise. On his view the government is required to
pay compensation when it uses the property to provide goods and
services, but not when it arbitrates private disputes-for instance,

.co See Lawrence Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An
Economic Analysis, 72 Cal. L. Rev. 569 (1984).
.ct See id. at 572.
4 See Michelman, supra note 10, at 1214-24.
.o Michelman recognized the potential unfairness of refusing compensation on utili�
tarian grounds, even after demoralization costs are taken into account, and he
presented a Rawlsian fairness approach as an alternative to his utilitarian approach,
However, he viewed a purely fairness-based jurisprudence of the Takings Clause as
practically unworkable. See id. at 1248-53.
'"See, e.g., Levmore, supra note 11, at 1334 (suggesting that "[r]esponsibilities that
private parties can impose on each other through the tort system, and thus without
compensation, can similarly be imposed by the government without compensation");
Fischel, supra note 10, at 351-53 (arguing that compensable takings should be found
where regulations diverge from social norms); Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Seger�
son, Regulatory Takings: When Should Compensation Be Paid?, 23 J. Legal Stud.
749,750 (1994) (adopting a straightforward utilitarian efficiency test).
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by preventing noxious uses.45 Jed Rubenfeld's variation on Sax's
test requires com ensation whenever the post-taking property is
y
put to public use.
Few of these theories attempt to do more than identify the dif
ference between regulatory takings and noncompensable exercises
of the police power. Saul Levmore is one of the few to note that
"every theory of takings should explain or at least struggle with the
question of why the power to tax-without compensation, of
course-is not fundamentally inconsistent with the constitutional
obligation to compensate condemnees";47 however, there is little
serious work on the subject."

II. THE EFFICIENCY AND FAIRNESS OF DERNATIVE TAKINGS

A. Derivative Takings and Compensation
The various rationales discussed earlier can be lumped into two
general categories: fairness-based justifications and efficiency
based justifications.49 For the purpose of this Essay, we do not need
to decide which of these sets of justifications is preferable. As we
show, failure to compensate for derivative takings is at odds with
both.
Efficiency-based justifications focus on the concern that without
compensation, the government will excessively exercise its eminent
domain power. That is, government will take private property for
societal use, even where doing so reduces net social welfare. Fair
ness-based justifications are based on the idea that it is wrong to

�see Joseph L Sax. Takings and the Police Power, 74 Yale LJ. 36, 62-63 (1964).
Sax later recanted major parts of his theory. See Joseph L Sax, Takings, Private
Property and Public Rights, 81 Yale L.J. 149 (1971).
"'See Rubenfeld, supra note 4, at 1078-81
.n Saul Levmore, Just Compensation and Just Politics, 22 Conn. L Rev. 285, 292
(1990). Levmore seems to suggest that lack of compensation for taxes can be justified
only where the taxes can be seen to work an average reciprocity of benefits.
... Kaplow briefly suggested that taxes may be distinguished from compensable tak
ings on the grounds that taxes are intended to alter distribution of wealth. See
Kaplow, supra note 38, at 519. For a view that takings can legitimately be aimed at
redistribution, see Hanoch Dagan, Takings and Distributive Justice, 85 Va. L. Rev.
741, 767-68 (1999).
�9 There are, of course, categorical/formal approaches to takings jurisprudence, such
as those advanced by Sax, but even these must eventually be justified on either fair
ness or efficiency grounds. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
•
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"forc[e] some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole. ,,50
1.

The Inefficiency of Uncompensated Derivative Takings

Any taking generates positive and negative externalities.51 Every
time the government takes property and puts it to public use, it
creates winners and losers. Consider the example of a new high
way. The construction of a new highway positively affects
commuters and is likely to adversely affect people who reside in
close proximity to the new road. The same is true whenever the
government condemns private property to build a new airport, to
establish a new factory, or to erect a new park. However, the num
ber of people affected by various takings, as well as their respective
gains and losses, varies from one case to another. From an effi
ciency standpoint, a taking is justified only if the net gains to the
winners outweigh the net costs to the losers; otherwise, the
government action is inefficient. Indeed, the compensation re
quirement in the Fifth Amendment guarantees just that. The
compensation requirement forces the government to consider the
cost of its action to private property owners-a cost it could other
wise ignore. Yet, when the external effects of takings are not taken
into account, we can never be sure that the actions of government
promote economic efficiency.52
so Annstro ng v.

United States, 364 U.S.40, 49 (1960).
An externality may be defined as "a cost or benefit that the volWltary actions of
one or more people imposes or confers on a third party or parties without their con
sent." Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics 45 (1988). The classic
works on the subject are A.C. Pigou, The Economics of Welfare 172-203 (4th ed.
1948) (proposing internalization of externalities by taxation), and R.H. Coase, The
Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ.1,2,16-17 (1960) (positing that in the absence
of transaction costs, internalization will occur through private negotiations without
need for government intervention).
n The same argument can be made about "givings"-the systematic failure of the
government to take into account the windfalls resulting from government action. We
discuss this problem in a different article. See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parcho
movsky,supra note 14; see also Kaplow,supra note 38,at 567-68 (noting that benefits
as well as costs may be discounted by decisionmakers). Inter alia, these difficulties
arise as a result of the failure of the government to net out gains accruing to those
from whom property is "taken." Under the no-longer applied "benefit-offset" princi
ple, property owners claiming a taking would have their compensation reduced by the
amount of benefit the taking conferred on the owners• remaining property. See
Fischel, supra note 10, at 80-84. The problem of the distortions caused by the failure
51
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A simple example can illustrate this fact. Assume that the city of
Metropolis decides to construct a new airport. To do so, it will have
to condemn 20 private lots, and pay the owners compensation in
the amount of $1 million. The city estimates that the new airport
will bestow an aggregate benefit of $2 million on travelers who re
side within Metropolis' city limits. However, the noise from the
flights will also diminish the value of the property in a radius of two
miles from the airport by $1.5 million. It does not take much to see
that the plan is inefficient: it effects a net loss of $0.5 dollars. Yet,
current takings doctrine permits the city of Metropolis to operate
under the fiscal illusion that its plan should go forward.53 This is be
cause the noise damage suffered by nearby property owners is not
a taking, and thus the attendant cost of the taking to those owners
does not require compensation under existing case law. If the ex
ternal cost of building the airport falls on a relatively small group
of residents, who, for some reason, lacks sufficient political clout to
change the decision of the municipality, the plan is likely to go for
ward despite the fact that it is inefficient.
One can argue, of course, that the government will only take
private property when the taking is efficient. The government will
consider the aggregate costs and benefits of its actions independ
ently of its duty to pay compensation. But this argument is, at best,
Pollyannaish. When no compensation is required, one cannot rely
on the government to act efficiently. The aftermath of Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Councif4 provides a cogent example.

to consider the losses to all parties in calculating the utility of an action has recently
been reexamined in the context of tort. See Robert Cooter & Ariel Porat, Does Risk
to Oneself Increase the Care Owed to Others? Law and Economics in Conflict, 29 J.
Legal Stud. 19 (2000) (demonstrating that the failure of the Hand rule to take into ac
count potential harm to tortfeasors has led to the adoption of suboptimal standards of
care).
53 In saying that the government is susceptible to fiscal illusion-that is, that when
government does not have to bear the cost of its actions, it operates under the illusion
that its actions are costless-we do not take the further step of arguing that the gov
ernment acts like the rational wealth-maximizing individual prevalent in economists'
models. It is not clear what government maximizes; indeed, Arrow's theorem predicts
uncertainty. See Daniel A. Farber &PhilipP. Frickey, Law and Public Choice: A
Critical Introduction 38-39 (1991); Daniel A. Farber, Economic Analysis and Just
Compensation, 12 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 125, 129-32 (1992). Nevertheless, the empiri
cal data can be said to demonstrate that government does operate under fiscal
illusion. See Fischel, supra note 10, at 96-97; text accompanying notes 54-57 infra.
S4 505 u.s. 1003 (1992).
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In 1988, South Carolina enacted the Beachfront Management
Act,55 which prohibited development of certain coastal properties.
As a result of the law, David Lucas was unable to develop two lots
that he had purchased two years earlier for $487,500 each.56 After
extended litigation, the Supreme Court upheld Lucas's claim that
the legislation worked a taking, and that he was therefore entitled
to compensation.
Faced with a court order to compensate Lucas for the taking,
South Carolina bought the lots from Lucas for $425,000 each," re
pealed the preservation statute that had occasioned the lawsuit,
and offered for sale the two lots it had just taken from Lucas. As
tonishingly, South Carolina rejected an offer from Lucas's former
neighbors to purchase one of the lots for $315,000 and preserve it
undeveloped. Instead, the state sold the lots to a developer for
$392,500 each.58 The numbers reveal that the South Carolina gov
ernment was content to require beachfront preservation at a cost
of $487,500 per lot to Lucas (Lucas's purchase cost for the lots),
but not at a cost of $77,500 per lot to itself (the difference between
what the state would have received had it sold the lots to the pres
ervationist neighbors, versus what it received when it sold the lots
to the developer). This outcome suggests, at the very least, that
government's cost-benefit analysis is affected by its duty to com
pensate.
More importantly for our purposes, the outcome of Lucas
strongly suggests that the government will not, of its own initiative,
compensate-or even take into account-property owners who are
adversely affected by derivative takings.
2.

The Unfairness of Uncompensated Derivative Takings

The fact that takings create winners and losers also raises con..
cerns about the equity of government action.59 In contrast to

" S.C. Code Ann. § 48�39 -250 to -36 0. (Law. Co-op. 1990).
"'Lucas paid $9 75,000 for the two lots. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1006.
57The state also paid for Lucas's legal costs, bringing the total settlement to $1 .5
million. See H. Jane Lehman, Case Closed: Settlement Ends Property Rights Lawsuit,
Chi. Trib., July 25,1993, at G3.
.ss See Fischel, supra note 1 0, at 61.
59 Again, the same can be said for government actions resulting in windfalls. See su
pra note 52.
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efficiency-based concerns that focus on the welfare effects of gov
ernment action, fairness-based concerns focus on how the cost of
government action is distributed among the public. From a fairness
vantage point, the just compensation requirement embodies the
Kantian imperative that individuals be treated as ends and not as
means. 60 Accordingly, even when a taking is efficient it should not
disproportionately burden any individual member of society.
The Takings Clause assures fairness by requiring that the state
compensate individuals whose property would otherwise be sacri
ficed for the greater good. But here, again, by failing to
compensate for derivative takings, current takings doctrine violates
the underlying fairness rationale. Under current doctrine, it turns
out that certain individuals' property may be sacrificed for the
greater good after all. Consider again the case of United States v.
Causby.61 In Causby, the overflights occasioned a loss upon all of
the owners in the neighborhood overflown by airplanes using the
new flight routes. However, the only property owners to receive
compensation were those whose property was directly beneath the
new air routes. Other property owners were effectively forced to
subsidize the new policy. Regardless of whether the establishment
of the new air routes was efficient, it is difficult to contrive a fair
ness principle to support the compensation of some, but not all, of
the harmed property owners in Causby and similar cases.
More importantly, and somewhat ironically in light of the gen
eral rhetoric accompanying the takings debates, uncompensated
derivative takings tend to severely disadvantage the poor and dis
enfranchised. Absent the need to compensate, it is political power,
rather than an economic calculus, which dictates the siting of
takings accompanied by negative extemalities.62 While this phe
nomenon has prompted debate in the new field of "environmental
justice,''63 it has otherwise tended to escape the notice of takings
scholars. Assume that the city of Metropolis needs to build a new
power plant. Two sites are suitable for the project: the first one is

• See Immanuel Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals 46
(Thomas K. Abbott trans., Liberal Arts Press 1949) (1785).
11 2
3 8 U.S. 256 (1946); see supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
62 See Farber, supra note 53, at 129-31.
61 See, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing "Environmental Justice": The Distribu
tional Effects of Environmental Protection, 87 Nw. U. L. Rev. 787 (1992).
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in the middle of the most affluent neighborhood, and the second is
in the middle of the most poor and neglected neighborhood. In the
ordinary course of politics, Metropolis will choose the second op
tion.
Of course, even if derivative takings required compensation, it
would still make sense for the government to condemn the cheap
est property so as to minimize its financial liability. Empirical
evidence indeed suggests that in real world takings, local and fed
eral governments prefer to take property on the cheap.64 But if
compensation for derivative takings is mandatory, those who are
repeatedly forced to bear the burden of government takings-the
poor-will not be made economically worse off by the government
taking.
B.

The Inadequacy of Existing Theory and Doctrine

Having established a prima facie case for compensating for de
rivative takings, we must now consider whether there are any
oveniding doctrinal or theoretical reasons for leaving this problem
unattended. Three reasons seem particularly pertinent: nuisance
law, the principle of reciprocity of advantage, and concerns for the
cost and practicality of administering a compensation scheme for
derivative takings.
1.

Nuisance Law

The tort of nuisance entitles the users of land to compensation
for damages arising from an unreasonable and substantial interfer
ence with the use and enjoyment of Iand.65 Accordingly, one might
argue that any property owner suffering from a derivative taking
can find her remedy in nuisance law.
As a preliminary matter, it is not self-evident that by placing de
rivative takings in the nuisance box, the government would escape
its constitutional duty to compensate. Indeed, Richard Epstein has
controversially argued that all government torts are takings, for

See sources cited supra note 53.
See W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts
619-23, 626 (5th ed. 1984).
61

65

§§ 87-88, at
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which the Takings Clause mandates compensation.66 But irrespec
tive of whether Epstein is correct, compensation for damages in
nuisance actions is not an adequate substitute for compensation for
derivative takings.
Nuisance--labeled by Prosser as a "legal garbage can"-is a
highly imperfect remedy for damage to property.67 First, nuisance
law is triggered only by unreasonable acts. The definition of rea
sonableness in nuisance law has sparked substantial disagreement.
Some courts have ruled that the reasonableness requirement goes
to the level of interference.68 The Restatement,s view, however, is
that reasonableness in the context of nuisance is identical to the
reasonableness requirement in the context of negligence. Specifi
cally, the Restatement instructs the court to determine whether
"the gravity of the harm outweighs the utility of the actor's con
duct."69 Under this test, victims of derivative takings will not
receive compensation if the government can show that, on the
whole, a taking effected a net gain.70
Second, nuisance law requires a plaintiff to prove substantial in
terference with her use or enjoyment of land; interference that
does not meet this standard is not actionable in nuisance. Although
derivative takings may sometimes satisfy the substantiality re-

M See Epstein, supra note 10, at 46, 49. Epstein even identifies Causby as providing
evidence that compensation for nuisances is constitutionally mandated. Like practi
cally every aspect of Epstein's Takings, this idea has its detractors. See, e.g., Mark
Kelman, Taking Takings Seriously: An Essay for Centrists, 74 Cal. L Rev. 1829
(1986) (book review).
67 William L. Prosser, Nuisance Without Fault, 20 Tex. L. Rev. 399, 410 (1942); see
Keeton et al., supra note 65, § 86, at 616 (''There is perhaps no more impenetrable
jungle in the entire law than that which surrounds the word 'nuisance.,).
a See, e.g., Boomer v. Atl. Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970) (granting an
injunction to the plaintiff landowners unless the defendant cement plant owner
compensated the plaintiffs for the total economic loss to their property (present and
future) caused by the defendant's operations, where total damage to the plaintiffs'
properties was relatively small in comparison with the value of the defendant's opera
tion); Jost v. Dairyland Power Coop. 172 N.W.2d 647 (Wis. 1969) (upholding the
exclusion of evidence offered by the defendant to show that the utility of its power
plant outweighed the gravity of the harm caused by the plaintiffs) .
18 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 826(a) (1977) .
70 For theorists who would compensate only where the costs of government action
are outweighed by its benefits, this would not be a terribly disturbing result per se.
See supra text accompanying notes 42-44. But it is unlikely that the cost-benefit
analysis contemplated by nuisance would include all of the factors required by
Michelman, such as demoralization costs.
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quirement, they will often be too minor to support a nuisance
claim.11 Importantly, though, the fact that the interference is insub
stantial in each individual case does not mean that it is also
insubstantial when all individual interferences are aggregated. Yet,
nuisance law requires each individual plaintiff to have an action
able claim.
Third, nuisance law protects use and enjoyment of land. Deriva
tive takings, on the other hand, affect the value of property,n an
interest that in many cases differs from use and enjoyment. For ex
ample, the paving of a new highway in proximity to a
neighborhood often diminishes the value of all the properties in
the neighborhood-even those that are not affected by the traffic.
Yet, because nuisance law focuses only on use and enjoyment, it
offers no protection against diminution in value, and property
owners whose enjoyment and use have not been hampered will go
uncompensated even if the value of their property has dropped
substantially.
Nuisance law does provide for damages occasioned by "public
nuisances," that is, acts that interfere with general community in
terests or the comfort of the public at large, even where the acts do
not affect the use and enjoyment of land.73 Public nuisances are
only actionable, however, if the plaintiff suffers special or unique
harm.74 Thus, property owners whose property values have been
diminished by an act that is not actionable as an ordinary, or pri
vate, nuisance will not likely find their remedy in public nuisance
either.
For all these reasons, many cases of derivative takings, including
severe ones, will fly under the nuisance radar screen. Nevertheless,
one might ask why the government should be forced to pay for ex
ternalities that are not actionable as torts while private property
owners may create such externalities without having to compen
sate.75 There are at least four reasons to reject such an approach.
See Keeton et al., supra note 65, § 88, at 626-27.
The property may be real or personal property.
73 See Keeton et al., supra note 65, § 86, at 618.
74 See Richard A. Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and Its Utilitarian Con
straints, 8 J. Legal Stud. 49, 98-102 (1979) (discussing the distinction between private
and public nuisance).
75 Cf. Levmore, supra note 11, at 1334 (arguing that the government should be liable
only where a private party would be liable).
71

71
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First, the compensation to be paid for derivative takings is solely
for externalities created by exercise of the power of eminent do
main, a power generally unavailable to private actors. Thus, there
is no private parallel to the derivative taking. Second, the gov
ernment may regulate the creation of, and compensation for, ex
ternalities among private parties. However, other than structural
and political limitations imposed on the government, such as those
imposed by the Takings Clause, the government cannot be regu
lated by another party. Consequently, there is greater need to
ensure compensation for government-created externalities than for
privately created externalities. Third, the imposition of negative
externalities on private individuals by other individuals is sharply
limited by the existence of social norms, which sanction certain
kinds of socially undesirable behavior.76 There is little reason to
suppose that the government is similarly subject to the curbing ef
fects of social norms.71 Finally, it would be more fair and efficient to
respond to the disparity in treatment of externalities by curbing
private owners' ability to impose negative externalities on their
neighbors, rather than by allowing the government to impose simi
lar negative externalities.

2. Average Reciprocity ofAdvantage

,
The concept of "average reciprocity of advantage' as a justifica
tion for avoiding compensation was most prominently identified by
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon.18 Seeking to distinguish Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylva
nia;19 Justice Holmes noted that some regulations, while diminish
ing the value of property in one respect, could be said to benefit
the property owner in another respect, such that no additional
compensation is required. For example, a regulation forcing mining
companies to leave intact pillars of coal in abandoned mines was
excused from the compensation requirement because the regula-

'76 See Robert C. Ellickson, Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes
208-10 (1991).
77 a. Fischel, supra note 10, at 351-53 (arguing that compensable takings should be
found where regulations diverge from social norms).
78 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). Justice Holmes first coined the term "average reciprocity
of advantage" in Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U.S. 22, 30 (1922).
79 232 u.s. 531 (1914).
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tion benefited the mine owners by protecting the safety of their
employees.80
It is not entirely clear how the concept of "advantage" is to be
measured in order to determine whether a given regulation pro·
duces average reciprocity. If the value of the advantage must be
precisely equal to the loss, the question of whether there is average
reciprocity of advantage (thereby defeating the need for finding a
taking) becomes identical to the question of whether "just compen
sation" has been paid. Whether referred to as an advantage or
compensation, the benefit received by the property owner would
only exempt the government from compensation if it were equal in
magnitude to the loss created by the regulation.
On the other hand, if the calculus is looser, as seemed to be the
case in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 81 the
principle of average reciprocity of advantage could become of·
fensive to any notion of fairness or efficiency.82 Why should inade·
quate compensation become satisfactory simply because it is in the
form of an "advantage" rather than a cash payment? Assume that
the paving of a new highway had the following effect on Sue, a
nearby neighbor: It brought her one minute closer to the nearest
interstate highway, and reduced the value of her property by
$100,000. Under a broad interpretation of the average reciprocity
of advantage principle, the quicker access to the interstate may
constitute adequate compensation for Sue's loss. But this result
clearly violates the spirit and the goals of the Fifth Amendment.83
Even more importantly, it is difficult to see why the concept of
average reciprocity of advantage should have any particular force
with regard to derivative takings. Indeed, to the extent that fairness
and efficiency require accurate evaluation of the losses imposed by

80 See Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415. The related "benefit-offset" principle is discussed su
pra at note 52.
8l 438 u.s. 104, 130-31 1978).
a The Penn Central Court noted that, in theory, property owners could transfer the
development rights blocked by the regulation in question to adjacent properties. The
Court did not ask whether the transferable development rights were equal in value to
the air rights that could no longer be exercised. See Penn Cent. Tramp. Co., 438 U.S.
at 129-35.
a A more congenial concept of the average reciprocity of interest test might see it as
an attempt to incorporate the idea that the government action is actually better
viewed as a tax. See supra note 48; infra text accompanying notes 127-28.

(
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government action, it is all the more important that derivative tak
ings be taken into account in order to determine whether a
government action has, in fact, created an average reciprocity of
advantage.
Finally, the average reciprocity of advantage principle is irrele
vant to many cases of derivative takings. For example, the new
highway may not confer any benefit whatsoever on Sue and her
neighbors if no on-ramp exists near their residences. There is no
inherent reason to suppose that a property owner suffering from a
derivative taking is more likely to receive an advantage than a
property owner who suffered a physical or regulatory taking.
The true usefulness of relying on average reciprocity of advan
tage is its promise of savings in administrative costs. Relying upon
the assumption of an average reciprocity of advantage absolves
courts of the difficult task of measuring benefits and losses to de
termine whether a given exercise of the power of eminent domain
is efficient and fair. We therefore turn now to the question of ad
ministrative costs.

3.

Practicality and Administrability

Administrative costs have played a decisive role in defining the
shape and scope of takings jurisprudence. Frank Michelman has
explicitly attributed the "jarring outcomes" produced in cases such
as Causby to the "felt need of courts for doctrinal principles which
can be stated generally and yet incisively enough to conform visibly
with the ideal of an impersonal justice. "84 Empirical data have con
firmed the need for concern. One study showed that in highway
projects, for every dollar issued in compensation for property
seized by eminent domain, an additional twenty-three cents were
expended in administrative costs.as Concern for inadministrability is
responsible, in large part, for the reluctance to extend the Takings
aause to regulatory takings. Once the floodgates open, so the ar
gument goes, the legal system will drown.86 This concern has also
" Michelman, supra note 10, at 1170.
See Joseph J. Cordes & Burton A. Weisbrod, When Government Programs Cre·
ate Inequities: A Ouide to Compensation Policies, 4 J. Pol'y Analysis & Mgmt. 178,
190 (1985).
" See, e.g., Nell K. Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives: Choosing Institutions In Law,
Economics & Public Policy 234-50 (1994).
85
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led various theorists to argue that as long as a taking is, on the
whole, efficient, there is no need for precise accounting among
winners and losers, and the losses should lie where they fall.87
While this concern certainly has merit, its power has been over
stated. First, administrative efficiency is not the only goal
promoted by the Takings Clause.88 A concern for the distribution
of societal burdens may trump administrative efficiency considera
tions, and as we showed, the problem of derivative takings
disproportionately harms the poor. Second, in the remainder of
this Essay, we will demonstrate that the inad.m.inistrability problem
can be overcome through the self-assessment mechanism that we
develop in the next part.
III. TAKINGS AND SELF-ASSESSMENT

Self-assessment is an important, yet largely unrecognized,
mechanism of law enforcement.89 Potentially, self-assessment offers
two advantages over administrative or judicial assessment mecha
nisms: reduced administrative costs and superior information. Self
assessment mechanisms place the burden of reporting and evaluat
ing harms and benefits on the primary targets of these effects: the
individuals who experience them. Yet, as Saul Levmore has noted,
self-assessment remains a mostly untapped source.90 Aside from the
instance of income tax reporting, self-assessment remains a suspect
tool. The main source of this suspicion is the fear of strategic re
porting; in the absence of an external check on the self-assess
ment's veracity, individuals will have the incentive to overreport
their entitlement to benefits and underreport their liabilities.
Self-assessment is readily applicable to derivative takings. As in
other contexts, however, the key to utilizing the self-assessment
mechanism effectively in the realm of derivative takings is to craft
an effective mechanism for combating strategic reporting. We pro
pose a self-assessment mechanism that incorporates probabilistic
auditing and weighted penalties. Our mechanism is modeled in
r�

See supra notes 43-45.
See Michael A. Heller & James E. Krier, Deterrence and Distribution in the Law
of Takings, l12 Harv. L. Rev. 997, 998-1002 (1999).
89 See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shaven, Optimal Law Enforcement with Self
Reporting ofBehavior, 102 J. Pol. Econ. 583 {1994).
llQ See Levmore, supra note 16, at 771.
811
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part on the income tax enforcement apparatus91 and meets the need
for low cost and accuracy. In addition, the auditing and penalty
mechanism allays the concern of strategic reporting by providing
optimal incentives to report truthfully. Finally, by ensuring the
simplicity of the mechanism, we avoid the excessive externalization
of administrative costs on private property owners, a difficulty that
plagues the income tax reporting system.
Our self-assessment model draws on the central insight of Gary
Becker's pioneering model of law enforcement.91 Becker was the
first to note the virtues of probabilistic enforcement. Working in
the area of criminal law, he observed that perfect detection and
punishment of all criminal violations, even if achievable, would be
socially undesirable. Given the existence of enforcement costs, the
more efficient solution, he suggested, is to enforce the law prob
abilistically-that is, to prosecute only some violators while raising
the penalties to compensate for the partial enforcement. Becker
demonstrated that such probabilistic enforcement preserves ex
ante deterrence at a lower cost than a system of full enforcement.
Extending Becker's work, Louis Kaplow and Steven Shaven dem
onstrated that optimal enforcement schemes with self-reporting are
more efficient than ones without self-reporting, since self-reporting
further reduces enforcement costs.93 We show that with the neces
sary adjustments, self-assessment and self-reporting can reduce
transaction costs sufficiently to enable compensation of derivative
takings.

A. A Model of the Self-Assessment Mechanism
In our proposal, any government exercise of the power of emi
nent domain entitles affected property owners to file a self
assessment report. In other words, the triggering event is either the
commencement of condemnation proceedings or a finding of in-

91 See James J. Freeland et al., Fundamentals of Federal Income Taxation 962-85
(11th ed. 2000) (surveying the self-assessment, auditing, and penalty procedures in the
federal income tax apparatus); James Andreoni et al., Tax Compliance, 36 J. Econ.
Literature 818 (1998).
91 Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. Pol. Econ.
169 (1968).
93 See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 89, at 584-85.
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verse condemnation.94 Once the triggering event occurs, property
owners claiming a derivative taking will be allowed one year to file
their reports. In the report, property owners will have to specify
only three items: the identity of the taking occasioning the loss, the
base value of the property, and the magnitude of the loss. In the
ordinary course of events, the government will compensate the
property owner at the amount claimed in the report. However, a
certain percentage of the reports will be audited, and if the auditor
determines that the claim is exaggerated, the payment will be re
duced by the amount of exaggeration and an additional penalty
calibrated to optimize deterrence. Owners disagreeing with the au
dit results will be entitled to appeal to a court of law.
The key to the efficient operation of the reporting mechanism
lies in setting the penalty amount so as to generate optimal deter
rence, and to offset the cost of the exaggerations that occur despite
the penalties." Specifically, the penalties discounted by the likeli
hood of being audited must eliminate the inherent incentive to
overreport, and must also compensate the government for the ex
cessive amounts paid to exaggerating property owners whose
reports were not audited.
The optimal penalty is represented by the formula P = px = (1/a
- l)x, where P is the penalty, p is the penalty multiplier (that is, the
number by which the overreported amount is multiplied to arrive
at the magnitude of the penalty), x is the overreported amount, and
a is the probability of detection. This penalty ensures optimal de
terrence, since it creates the maximum expected payoff for owners
at a self-assessment with zero overreporting.

" Unlike a condemnation proceeding, an inverse condemnation proceeding is not an
administrative action that is initiated by the government under expUcit authority of
the eminent domain power. Rather, to pursue an inverse condemnation claim, an ag
grieved owner must bring a law suit alleging the uncompensated and unacknowledged
exercise of eminent domain power. See Jesse Dukeminier & James E. Krier, Property
1168 (4th ed. 1998).
liS Exaggerations will occur despite the penalty because different property owners
have different attitudes toward risk. Risk-seeking property owners will exaggerate
their reports despite the risk of being penalized.
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The payoff for any given exaggeration is determined by the for
mula

f(x)

=

(1 - a)(v + x) + a(v - P)

where f(x) is the expected payoff for any given exaggeration x, v is
the true value of the loss occasioned by the derivative taking, and
all other variables are as described above. The maximum payoff is
determined by the partial differential off(x) with respect to x, at

8f(x)l Ox = 1 - a(1 -p)

=

0

which is at p = 1/a - 1, or P = (1/a - l)x, as noted above.
The penalty also ensures that the net government payout will be
optimized since the total payout, G, will be represented by
w

(v - P )
1•1 [(1 - a) (x, + v1) + a , 1 ]

G -I,

where w is the total number of property owners.96 Assuming that
exaggerations are equally distributed across property owners, and
given that the penalty is set at P = (1/a - 1)x, the total payout
should be at G = wx + wv - awx - awv + awv + awx - wx, or simply
G = wv, which is the total value of the property loss. Thus, the gov
ernment payout, assuming a properly calibrated penalty, will equal
the net loss to property owners.
A simple numeric example may illustrate the mechanism. Imag
ine that the city of Metropolis paves a new road. The city initiates
condemnation proceedings against the owners whose property will
be paved over, and ten owners of property abutting the new road
file self-assessments. The ten abutting lots drop in value by $50,000
each, from $250,000 to $200,000. However, each of the ten home
owners exaggerates her damage by $10,000, reporting a loss of
$60,000. Assume that the practice in the city of Metropolis is to au
dit ten percent of the reports-in our case, one report out of the
ten-and that the auditor immediately spots the exaggeration. To
make up for the ten percent audit rate, Metropolis should impose a

116 We assume, for simplicity's sake, that the average exaggeration is equally distrib
uted across reporting property owners.
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false reporting penalty of nine times the magnitude of the exag
geration-in our example, a penalty of $90,000.97

B. Enriching the Basic Model
1. Assumptions Revisited
The above illustration incorporates two simplifying assumptions.
First, we assumed that audits are perfectly effective and completely
random-that is, that the chance of one's exaggeration being de
tected is identical to the percentage of the reports being audited.
Second, we treat the exaggerations as being randomly distributed
and of random magnitude across the entire population such that
they may be averaged. Neither assumption is likely to obtain in re
ality. As in the case of income tax oversight, audits may be
triggered by suspicious elements in the reports such as unusually
high reported property values. Exaggerations will vary in reference
to expectations of avoiding detection as well as such factors as rela
tive propensity for risk.
None of this undermines the validity of our self-assessment
mechanism. Rather, relaxing the simplifying assumptions rein
forces the validity and reliability of our proposal. Selective auditing
will only increase the likelihood of detecting overreporting. When
auditors are free to select which report to audit, they will, no
doubt, focus on the ones reporting a higher than average loss: any
deviations from the average figure will immediately attract the eye
of the auditor. Furthermore, and by contrast to income tax audits,
in the case at hand, various external indicia put the auditor in an
excellent informational position to detect exaggerations. Not only
does the auditor know the reports of other neighbors, but she also
knows the amount paid to neighboring homeowners whose prop
erty was physically taken (in the eminent domain cases)98 and the
valuation of the property for property tax purposes. For these rea
sons, the percentage of exaggerated reports detected by targeted

=

w In this example, the likelihood of being audited is 0.1, so the penalty multiplier (p
1/a -1) should be 1/0.1 - 1 = 9. The actual penalty (P = px) should be 9 x $10,000 =

$90,000.
98 Below, in Part IV, we propose extending the self-assessment mechanism to physi
cal takings as well. If this proposal is adopted, the external validation of a judged
condemnation value would no longer be available.
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audits is likely to be higher than the percentage of exaggerated re
ports detected in a random audit. This should more than offset the
risk of being unable to detect an exaggeration in an audit. It is true,
of course, that exaggerations will not be randomly distributed
across the population-some people are innately more risk prone
than others. But this fact does not, ex ante, skew the results in fa
vor of those not audited.99
A more serious challenge to our self-assessment mechanism is
that real estate appraisal is not a precise science. The data neces
sary to evaluate property under standard appraisal methods, such
as comparable sales, may not be available. Furthermore, even
where data is readily available, appraisers may reasonably differ in
their interpretation of the data. To accommodate this challenge, we
propose that minor variations of up to five percent not be penal
ized, although the government's appraisal would still control. The
property owner would have to pay the amount assessed by the
government, but no weighted penalty would be added.
It is important, though, that the government not reveal its allow
ance of a "de minimis" defense to penalty assessments, lest
homeowners routinely add a standard five percent exaggeration to
their self-assessments!00 In other words, we encourage the govern
ment to maintain "acoustic separation" with respect to its leniency
rate.101

• For a general discussion of the effects on deterrence of relaxing the assumption of
risk-neutrality, see A. Mitchell Polinsky, An. Introduction to Law and Economics 7586 (2d ed. 1989). The movement away from random audits to targeted audits may in
troduce the complication of strategic reporting-a difficulty we do not address.
100 Wh
en the leniency rate is known to property owners, slight overreportin.g impli
cates very little risk. If not audited, overreporting would result in overcompensation.
If caught, they will receive the true compensation they deserve. However, due to the
inherent indeterminacy of real estate appraisal, homeowners are unlikely to take ad
vantage of the full five percent grace. As with their entire reporting strategy, their
decision to exploit the de minimis defense will depend on their propensity for risk.
101 M
eir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in
Criminal Law, 97 Harv. L Rev. 625, 630 (1984) (explaining how the legal system,
through selective transmission. of legal rules, can effectively separate "conduct rules"
addressed to the public at large from "decision rules" addressed to officials who apply
conduct rules).
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2. Calibrating the Penalty
Thus far we have set the penalty at what our formula establishes
as the optimal deterrence level. Importantly, however, ours is one
of those rare cases in which there is no concern about over
deterrence. Should the government decide to assess penalties in
excess of our suggested amount, it does not present a problem for
our mechanism. Our formula only establishes the minimum penalty
to be imposed. This is due to the fact that the ideal amount of over
reporting is zero, and as penalties can only be assessed on
exaggerations; the government has no way to subvert the mecha
nism into a revenue raising measure. Raising the penalty amount
will prompt assessors to report truthfully, which will lead, in equi
librium, to zero revenues to the government.102
To be sure, there will be cases in which the penalty will generate
inadequate deterrence. The paradigm instance of underdeterrence
is one in which the homeowner lacks the wherewithal to pay the
assessed penalty. For instance, a homeowner whose house is mort
gaged to its full value, and who lacks other assets, will not be
deterred by the prospect of being penalized because the penalty
cannot be collected. The homeowner may, therefore, be predis
posed to overreport. To alleviate this problem, criminal sanctions
must be available against those who deliberately overreport.
While, at first glance, this measure may seem extreme, it is neces
sary to prevent deliberate defrauding of the public, and indeed, it is
widely accepted in the tax context. Property owners are entitled to
just compensation, but not to plundering of the public fisc. The
self-assessment mechanism that we propose enables the award of
compensation to those whose political weakness allows them to be
victimized by the government. It would be unjust and inefficient to
100
allow fraudulent abuse of this mechanism.
102 'This assumes that there is no fe-ar of government error in issuing assessments and
that homeowners are confident that they can be indemnified in the event that they
present a mistaken assessment based on a faulty appraisal. If these two assumptions
are relaxed, overdeterrence may prevent some homeowners from presenting true re
ports lest they be penalized.
tGJ Obviously, some good faith defense must be available. It would be morally repre
hensible to jail someone simply because she lacked assets with which to pay a fine. It
is important to realize, however, that all deterrence-based models have no applicabil
ity to individuals who make innocent mistakes that cannot be prevented with greater
caution. Furthermore, property owners who overreport on account of the negligence
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Collusion

Another refinement must be added to our model to meet the po
tential threat of property owners colluding to misrepresent the
value of their assets. For example, homeowners located near a po
tential highway may decide to collectively overreport the noise
damage, hoping that the similarity of reported values will shield the
exaggeration from audit. It is important to note at the outset that
such collusive strategy is highly unlikely. First, as is the case with
any collusion, each colluder has a strong incentive to defect.104 In
the present context, each reporter can increase her expected payoff
by exaggerating marginally less than her neighbors. Second, the
possibility of collusive behavior is further restricted by the fact that
auditors can examine real estate property tax assessments and
compare them with the self-assessed reports. Nevertheless, to fur
ther reduce the likelihood of collusive false reporting, we
recommend the imposition of joint and several liability on collud
ing homeowners. This would enable the government to collect the
debts of colluders who lack the financial means to pay them from
other, wealthier, colluders, thereby increasing the deterrent effect
on each individual homeowner.

C.

The Insurance Alternative

Various scholars have expressed the view that private insurance
may be superior to government compensation in effecting efficient
allocation of resources.105 This view emphasizes the effectiveness of
insurance in causing insured homeowners to consider the social
cost of their decisions. Assume, for example, that a developer must

of the appraisers they hired should have a cause of action against those appraisers in
tort. This chosen action might provide an asset that can be used to satisfy a fine.
101 Co
llusive agreements among property owners, like any other cartel, are character
ized by a prisoner's dilemma payoff matrix and thus provide conspirators with a strong
incentive to defect. While cooperation produces the highest aggregate payoff, defection
increases the private payoff of each individual actor. For a more in depth discussion of
the problem of cartelization, see Andrew R. Dick, When Axe Cartels Stable Contracts?,
39 J.L. & Econ. 241 (1996) (analyzing the conditions under which cartels are stable). A1s
a general rule, it is widely accepted that collusion is less likely to succeed when the
number of colluders is large. See George A. Hay & Daniel Kelley, An Empirical Survey
of Price FIXing Conspiracies, 17 J.L. & Econ. 13, 14 (1974).
105 See Blume & Rubinfeld, supra note 40, at 567-69; Kaplow, supra note 38, at

538-41.

308

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 87:277

decide whether to construct a hotel or a camping site in an area
susceptible to flooding.106 Building the hotel guarantees the devel
oper a higher payoff, but at the same time imposes on society the
cost of compensating the developer in the case of flood. When the
societal cost element is taken into account, building the camping
site is actually the better option. However, since she is guaranteed
compensation, our developer will opt to build the hotel. Thus, the
Takings Oause creates an incentive for property owners to engage
in excessively risky projects and spread the cost of the risk on soci
ety as a whole. Insurance, it is suggested, can overcome this
problem,X07 and, more importantly for our purpose, insurance can
compensate property owners for any loss caused by a derivative
taking without creating a need for government compensation.
Aside from the Constitution's specific dictate of government
provided compensation, and the observable fact that the market
has not yet produced private takings insurance, 108 there are a num
ber of prudential reasons to reject the insurance alternative. First,
as Thomas Miceli has argued, the incentive analysis underlying the
argument for insurance may be in error. Once one assumes both
that the government takes into account the cost of compensation in
its decision to take and that a property owner takes into account
the likelihood of a taking in her decision to develop, owners will
move toward optimal levels of investment. Owners will fear that if
they overdevelop their property, they will deter a government tak
ing and be left bearing the loss of the needless development.109
Second, William Fischel and Perry Shapiro have observed that
the insurance approach rests upon another faulty assumption, in
that it relies upon an outmoded "Pigouvian" notion of the govern-

106 This
example is a simplified version of the example discussed by WiUiam Fischel
and Peny Shapiro in Takings, Insurance, and Michelman: Comments on Economic
Interpretations of "Just Compensation" Law, 17 J. Legal Stud. 269, 271-76 {1988).
107 It is worth noting that the discussion of insurance against takings focuses primar·
ily on the threat of regulatory takings. It is not obvious that all the arguments for and
against insurance are directly applicable in the context of derivative takings. A full
exploration of this issue is beyond the ken of this Essay.
1flll O
thers commenting on the lack of privately supplied insurance include Blume &
Rubinfeld, supra note 40, at 569.
1DP See Thomas J. Miceli, Compensation for the Taking of Land Under Eminent
Domain, 147 J. Institutional & Theoretical Econ. 354, 358-59 (1991).
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ment.110 This view posits that the government always behaves effi
ciently to promote public welfare. Consequently, no external
checks on the government are necessary. However, modem public
choice theory rejects this unrealistic view of govemment111 and
cases such as Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council112 provide
ample evidence of the failures of the Pigouvian view. 113 In light of
the modem view of government, it is not enough to provide insur
ance-based compensation to private owners. It is also necessary to
demand government payment in order to deter inefficient govern
ment action.
Third, in addition to their failure to satisfy the efficiency con
cerns of the Takings Clause, insurance schemes fail to fully answer
fairness concerns as well. The availability of private insurance does
not take into account the demoralization costs identified by
Miche1man.114 On this view, when the government calculates
whether compensation is constitutionally warranted, it must con
sider the possible negative effects on morale occasioned on
individuals who feel unjustly victimized. As Fischel and Shapiro
write, the demoralizing effects of takings occur at the point in time
that individuals are made aware that their wealth is being taken
away, not at the point when the taking actually occurs. Thus, the
fact that property owners would be forced to purchase insurance
would itself create demoralization costs that would not be fully
compensated.115 The problem would be particularly exacerbated
were a particular class of property owners-the indigent-required
to pay higher insurance premiums due to their greater vulnerability
to government takings.
Fourth, establishing a system of private insurance introduces the
risk of insurance companies improperly influencing government
policy. This is a particular manifestation of the moral hazard prob-

uo

Fischel & Shapiro, supra note 106, at 276.
See Farber & Frickey, supra note 53, at 12-62.
Ill sos u.s. 1003 (1992).
nl
See supra Section U.A.1.
u•
See Michelman, supra note 10, at 1215.
115 See Fischel & Shapiro, supra note 106, at 2B7. The authors conclude that the "ex
istence of insurance
is no more an argument for legalizing uncompensated takings
than it is for legalizing the theft of watches." Id.
111

• . .
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lem.116 Insurance companies who stand to lose from certain takings
might exert improper influence on governmental decisions, by
means of political contributions or bribes, in order to increase their
revenues or minimize their losses. Of course, such influence is al
ready possible without insurance, which is why, as we noted earlier,
the burden of government takings tends to fall upon the poorest
and least politically powerful. However, the aggregation of prop
erty claims in the hands of private insurers will increase their
ability to influence the political process.
Fifth, a takings insurance scheme is vulnerable to adverse selec
tion. As Robert Ellickson has pointed out, public officials and land
developers may inform property owners of pending plans that
might affect the owners, which would prompt them to buy insur
ance in order to neutralize political opposition to the projects.117 As
a result, insurance companies will not be able to adequately diver
sify away the costs of selling takings insurance, and the insurance
mechanism will collapse. This is the obverse of the previous prob
lem, again reflecting the fact that the government behaves
differently than other actors and that the interests of politicians or
government managers may lead to a decision that would not be
reached if both costs and benefits were directly incorporated into
government budgets.
At the end of the day, then, private insurance is not an adequate
substitute for government compensation for derivative takings.

IV. TOWARD UNIFYING PRINCIPLES
We have, thus far, introduced a new form of compensable tak
ing-the derivative taking-and suggested a self-assessment
mechanism for administering the compensation. Yet, nothing in
our self-assessment mechanism limits it to derivative takings. The
introduction of self-assessment can go a long way towards address-

116 Generally, moral hazard is a concept associated with the tendency of the insured
to take too many risks in response to the knowledge that adverse results are indemni
fied by insurance. See, e.g., Polinsky, supra note 99, at 54-55. Interestingly, Blume
and Rubinfeld believe that insurance creates a very different moral hazard. namely,
that property owners will become indifferent to government takings and there will be
a lack of necessary lobbying. See Blume & Rubinfeld, supra note 40, at 597-98.
117 See Fischel & Shapiro, supra note 106, at 286 (citing a letter written to the au
thors by Ellickson).
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ing many of the shortcomings of takings doctrine. In this Part, we
show that our proposed self-assessment mechanism may be readily
extended to physical and regulatory takings. Furthermore, we sug
gest the utilization of the concept of derivative takings and the
mechanism of self-assessment to make sense of takings doctrine by
defining which takings should be compensable. We conclude this
Part by delineating the scope of self-assessment and defining its
boundaries.

A.

Physical and Regulatory Takings

Not only is our proposed method of self-assessment readily ap
plicable to physical takings, but it also improves upon the existing
system by reducing the cost of administering compensation. Allow
ing property owners to assess and report the losses occasioned
upon them by physical takings will result in compensation awards
no less accurate than those allowed under the existing court-based
system, but at a substantially reduced cost. The current compensa
tion mechanism relies on judicial determination of compensation
awards, and consequently, the grant of compensation is often pre
ceded by extended litigation.118 This process imposes a considerable
cost on property owners and unnecessarily burdens the judiciary.
The implementation of our proposed self-assessment mechanism
could dramatically decrease these costs. Rather than litigating all
cases that involve disagreement as to the appropriate compensa
tion, the government could allow property owners to report their
losses, could audit a certain percentage of the reports, and then pe
nalize overreports by using our formula. In fact, if the government

118 See sources cited supra note 53. See also Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1003, 1006 (1992) (reviewing the extensive history of the case from its beginnings in
1998 up until the Supreme Court granted certiorari); Dukeminier & Krier, supra note
94, at 1209 (reviewing the complicated aftermath of the Supreme's Court's decision in
Lucas that the government regulation was a taking); see also Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 421 (1982) (holding that a permanent physical
occupation of property is a taking). On remand, the New York Court of Appeals up
held the validity of the statutory provisions that authorized the Commission on Cable
Television to determine adequate compensation for homeowners harmed by the legis
lation. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 446 N.E.2d 428 (N.Y.
1983). Following this ruling, the Commission concluded that the one dollar compensa
tion award was sufficient since the installation of cable television usually increases the
value of the property. See Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 94, at 1137.
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calibrates the penalties correctly, very few incidents of overreport
ing-and hence, potential litigation-should be expected.
Removing the obstacle of administrability, we submit, is also the
key to a more coherent and well-defined regulatory takings doc
trine. We believe that the obscurity surrounding the compen
sability of regulatory takings is due in large part to the fear of
courts and commentators of the dire administrative consequences
that would befall us if the Takings Clause extended to cover all
compensatory· takings. While this concern is warranted, the analy
sis that underlies it fails to take into account the possibility of
crafting a superior administrative mechanism to address the con
cern. Self-assessment provides such an improved mechanism. The
adoption of our proposal would require court intervention only in
a tiny percentage of the cases-those cases where an audited
owner decides to appeal a finding of overreporting. If, for instance,
10% of reports were audited, 50% of all audited reports revealed
exaggeration sufficient to warrant a penalty, and 50% of all penal
ties were appealed in court, only 2.5% of all reports would require
the courts' intervention.
With concerns for inadministrability out of the way, policymak
ers could revisit and revise regulatory takings to take advantage of
the new possibility frontiers. Current regulatory takings doctrine
offers only three guideposts to the public. The first is that a sub
stantial diminution in value is a compensable taking.1 19 The
second-a rather trivial derivative of the first-is that a complete
wipeout of value amounts to a substantial diminution.120 The third
is a relic of a previous era, which posits that elimination of a nox
2
ious use is never a taking.1 1
The Court's current ad hoc test for substantial diminution has
proven nearly impossible to administer-in no small part because,
absent a total wipeout, there is no way to know whether the gov
ernment has gone too far. But with widespread information on
property losses provided by self-assessment reports, policymakers
could fashion per se rules for substantial diminution. For example,
See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029.
121 See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis,
Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 411 (1915).
1111

120

480 U.S. 470, 470 (1987);
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courts may set a rule that any diminution in excess of 25% percent
effects a compensable taking.122
Alternatively, it is possible to devise a more sophisticated as
sessment mechanism to examine more precisely the harms and
benefits that are produced by regulation and alleged to be a taking.
Current regulatory takings doctrine fails to incorporate adequately
one of the primary justifications for uncompensated regulations
the regulations' ability to prevent property owners from externaliz
ing on the public costs associated with their property. A new
assessment mechanism for alleged regulatory takings could incor
porate all the elements of our self-assessment mechanism for
derivative takings but also reduce a property owner's potential re
covery by the value of the negative externalities prevented by the
regulation.123 Such a mechanism would provide a more accurate
calculus of the efficacy of the regulation and would also produce
fairer results than any of the current doctrines.
Policymakers might even take the bold step of eschewing alto
gether impracticable tests such as substantial diminution and
hopeless debates about definitions of property.124 Instead, they
could rely on the limits of administrability to determine what is a
compensable regulatory taking. Such a pragmatic approach may be
the only workable solution to the regulatory takings challenge.
This approach requ4"es, however, a period of experimentation dur
ing which empirical data will be gathered on the costs of processing
and settling self-assessment claims.

122 Naturally, the relevant percentage may be higher or lower depending on one's
view of what constitutes substantial diminution. Of course, any number may be at
tacked as being arbitrary, which should tell us something about the usefulness of the
substantial diminution test.
1» In a related vein, Kaplow and Shavell proposed a self-reporting mechanism that
deals exclusively with the problem of private externalities. In their scheme, harm
causing individuals will be induced to self report their misdeeds in exchange for a
somewhat lower penalty than the one expected if the government detects the wrong
doing (the legal penalty multiplied by the probability of punishment). See Kaplow &
Shaven, supra note 89, at 587-90. Admittedly, measurement of such externalities, ei
ther in our scheme or in Kaplow and Shavell's, presents logistical problems far in
excess of those discussed in our Essay.
D4 For a review of the different interpretations of the notion of property, see Laura S.
Underkoffler, On Property: An Essay, 100 Yale L.J. 127, 130-42 (1990).
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The use of self-assessment can also answer the call for a de
minimis exception in takings law.%25 As Saul Levmore has noted,
self-assessment does not completely do away with administrative
costs-to some extent, it merely shifts them to private property
owners.126 And while shifting the costs to the party who can most
efficiently handle them reduces administrative costs, preparing
self-assessment reports will not be costless. Thus, placing the cost
of assessment on the property owners will necessarily eliminate in
substantial claims. No owner will incur the cost of preparing a
report if this cost exceeds the expected compensation.
We fully understand the need to allow the government to func
tion. Accordingly, we do not suggest that any government action
that adversely impacts property is by definition a taking; we remain
agnostic on this debate. We do submit, however, that the same cri
terion for compensation should apply to all three types of
takings-physical, regulatory, and derivative. It is senseless and un
justifiable that a diminution of one dollar due to a physical taking
is compensable per se, while a diminution of $100,000 resulting
from a derivative or regulatory taking can be effected with impu
nity. The source of the harm and the harm's effect on property
owners are the same, irrespective of classifications. By dramatically
reducing administrative costs, our self-assessment mechanism pre
sents the government with a unique opportunity to overhaul
takings jurisprudence and establish a uniform compensation crite
rion for all types of takings. Doing so will improve not only fairness
and efficiency, but also the mood of millions of property owners,
lawyers, and law students.
B.

Taxes and Takings

As we noted in Part I of this Essay, the taxing power remains the
neglected comer of the takings triangle. While it is universally ac
knowledged-as it must be-that the government may tax
property, theoreticians have rarely explored the notion that dimi-

us See, e.g., Heller & Krier, supra note 88, at 1008-09 (calling for the introduction of a
"de minimis" exception into takings doctrine).
126 See Levmore, supra note 16, at 812. In addition to the cost of appraising proper
ties, the auditing mechanism will generate costs that may have to be met by increasing
the magnitude of penalties.
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nutions of property value in the name of the police power or emi
nent domain could be considered noncompensable taxes.127 In a
rare exception, Carol Rose has justified the concept of public nui
sance-in which only those who have suffered special damage can
get redress against acts that interfere with community interests or
public comfort-on the grounds of in-kind taxation.128 But few have
systematically explored the idea that when the burden of a gov
ernment action falls on a sufficiently broad public in roughly equal
proportions, the action is better characterized as a tax than as a
taking or a regulation.
We do not offer an unqualified endorsement of this concept of
the taxing comer of the takings triangle. At least a colorable argu
ment exists that when payment can only be made with particular
property rather than a common means of exchange, the govern
ment action is a taking and not a tax. One might also argue that no
government action should be considered a tax unless it is primarily
concerned with the raising of revenue. Nevertheless, to the extent
that policymakers wish to adopt this concept of the taxing-takings
relationship, the information provided by widespread self
reporting could be critical. For example, if a government zoning
regulation uniformly reduces property values in an entire county
by ten percent, it may make more sense to consider the action a
"zoning tax" than a regulatory taking. Indeed, the action is the
equivalent of a ten percent property tax. Self-assessment reports
would provide the information necessary to discern the true nature
of government action. Specifically, the reports would indicate the
size of the population burdened by the government action, and the
distribution of the burden across the population.1zt

127 In one of Takings' most controversial passages, Epstein intimated that taxation
aimed at redistribution is, in fact, a taking. Epstein, supra note 10, at 99-100, 283-305.
He later disavowed this position. See Richard A. Epstein, Property. Speech, and the
Politics of Distrust, 59 U. Chi. L Rev. 41, 68-69, 87-88 (1992).
m See Carol M. Rose, A Dozen Propositions on Private Property, Public Rights,
and the New Takings Legislation, 53 Wash. & Lee L Rev. 265, 278 {1996).
129 Indeed, several commentators have suggested that compensation should depend
on whether the government action singles out a particular group. See Heller & Krier,
supra note 88, at 1008 (suggesting that absent evidence that a particular group was sin
gled out by the government, compensation should not be rendered for "small" takings);
Levmore, supra note 11, at 1344-47 (asserting that compensation for overflights
rightly depends, in practice, on whether owners have been singled out).

316

Virginia Law Review

[Vol.

87:277

C. Self-Assessment: Not a Panacea
Obviously, self-assessment is not an elixir. As any other mecha
nism, our self-assessment mechanism has inherent limitations.
First, our proposal cannot accommodate idiosyncratic tastes.130 In
dividuals who assign unique value to their property will be
systematically undercompensated, as they are now.131 It must be
borne in mind, however, that such undercompensation is inherent
in any regime that permits forced sales at market prices. Although
our scheme does not compensate owners for their loss of idiosyn
cratic value, neither does the compensation mechanism currently in
place. Notably, we do not suggest increasing the power of the gov
ernment to force sales, something that might introduce a new
source of unfairness, as well as create uncompensated demoraliza
tion costs.
Second, while our scheme substantially reduces administrative
costs, it does not completely eliminate them. As we noted, in part,
self-administration merely shifts administrative costs, albeit re
duced costs, to property owners seeking compensation.•:n Thus,
under our scheme, administrative costs remain a distorting factor
and a source of inadequate compensation, at least at the margin.
Moreover, the fact that property owners bear administrative costs,
rather than the government, may induce policymakers to create
unduly cumbersome record-keeping requirements and compensa
tion structures/" Administration, like any other government
function, is subject to fiscal illusion, and if creating administrative

See Levmore, supra note 16, at 780-82.
See Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 94, at 1121-23; Thomas J. Miceli, Economics
of the Law: Torts, Contracts, Property, Litigation 116 (1997): see also Coniston Corp.
v. Vill. of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 464 (7th C'u. 1988) ("Compensation [for
takings] in the constitutional sense is [] not full compensation, for market value is not
the value that every owner of property attaches to his property but merely the value
that the marginal owner attaches to his property. Many owners are 'intramarginal:
meaning that because of relocation costs, sentimental attachments, or the special suit
ability of the property for their particular (perhaps idiosyncratic) needs, they value
their property at more than its market value (i.e., it is not 'for sale').").
�»The fact that taxation also has administrative costs means that additional com
pensation payments will create a certain additional level of deadweight loss. See
Fischel, supra note 10, at 146. These are additional administrative costs that owners
will have to bear.
m The income tax self-assessment system provides a none-too-encouraging exam
ple.
130
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burdens is costless for the government, it may be tempted to over
regulate. Our self-assessment mechanism does not solve this
problem. Unfortunately, the world without administrative costs is
rarely found outside of economics journals, and placing administra
tive burdens on those who can most cheaply bear them is the best
that can be done in many circumstances.

CONCLUSION
In this Essay, we have uncovered and analyzed a previously un
appreciated dimension of the perennially troubling takings
jurisprudence-the adverse impact of government takings on
neighboring third parties. We showed that virtually every exercise
of the power of takings generates externalities-derivative tak
ings-that have largely evaded takings scholars. Furthermore, we
demonstrated that a takings system that fails to account for deriva
tive takings is neither efficient nor fair. To remedy this problem,
we constructed a self-assessment mechanism that incentivizes
property owners to report truthfully the losses they suffer as a re
sult of government takings. We accomplished this by basing our
mechanism on the principle of probabilistic enforcement accom
panied by weighted penalties for exaggerations. By lowering the
administrative cost of compensation, our self-assessment mecha
nism enables the compensation of currently uncompensated
property owners. Simultaneously, it enhances economic efficiency,
because it forces the government to fully internalize the cost of its
actions.
We also showed that the utilization of our self-assessment
mechanism could illuminate and improve many of the pitfalls of
existing .takings doctrine. Our self-assessment mechanism may be
used to compensate victims of physical takings and perform this
function at a much lower cost than the judicial mechanism cur
rently in place. Its utilization in the context of regulatory takings
offers the opportunity to reduce dramatically the cost of adminis
tering claims. This may, in turn, prompt policymakers finally to set
a clear rule as to when regulation "goes too far" and becomes an
exercise of the power of eminent domain. Finally, the information
garnered from the self-assessment report may enable us to distin
guish between uses of the taxation power that legitimately go
uncompensated and takings that demand compensation. We sub-
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mit that the aggregation of these effects would result in a better
and fairer use of the takings power and would begin the process of
injecting coherence into a desperately confused area of the law.
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